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ABSTRACT 
 The China threat is increasing over the Taiwan Strait due to the unbalanced 
military power between Taiwan and China. An effective asymmetric naval force within 
its economic constraints is necessary for Taiwan to deter or counter a potential invasion. 
This thesis focuses on exploring the optimal defense strategies and force numbers to 
provide an effective defense against a large-scale amphibious invasion. Through the use 
of simulation and data-farming techniques, a total of 6,120 campaigns were simulated 
followed by a breakpoint analysis to address the number of various maritime platforms 
and strategies the defense force should employ in order to neutralize the invasion. The 
results show the importance of preemptive defense tactics and data-sharing capabilities, 
and indicates that a defense force comprising 4 destroyers, 23 frigates, and 95 small 
missile craft provides a 70% success rate in countering a potential invasion. Lastly, the 
recommendations highlight the importance of the asymmetric force configuration in 
large-scale maritime defense. 
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The thesis addresses the impact of Taiwan’s defense forces using various concepts 
of operations (CONOPs), tactics, and communication situations in the event of defending 
against a large-scale amphibious invasion from the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN). This summary explains the scenario setup and the methodology of the thesis, and 
provides the analytic result, conclusion, and recommendations. The objective of this thesis 
is to explore the optimal strategy and the most effective employment of the Republic of 
China Navy (ROCN) in defending against a presumed large-scale PLAN invasion force. 
Taiwan used to enjoy sea and air supremacy over the Taiwan Strait for decades; 
however, the PRC’s PLAN has grown dramatically in both size and power over the past 
two decades. Thus, Taiwan is facing an unprecedented challenge. The military gap between 
China and Taiwan is increasing. The ROCN’s operational capabilities and force 
configuration need to be revaluated to prepare for confronting the Chinese threat in the 
future. Taiwan cannot afford to build up the same military capabilities that the PRC has; 
therefore, developing asymmetric capabilities may allow Taiwan the flexibility to defeat a 
cross-strait invasion within its economic and military constraints. A PLAN breakpoint 
analysis is necessary to help examine the capability gap between the ROCN and the PLAN, 
and support a solution to better ROCN defense capabilities within budget limitations. 
This thesis focuses on the following questions to explore the optimal defense 
strategy and force configuration to neutralize a presumed PLAN invasion. The primary 
question is: given Taiwan’s available military force, which of the three concepts of 
operation (CONOPs) listed below would be optimal to use to bring the PLAN amphibious 
assault force to its breakpoint?  
• Place small missile craft upfront to conduct a surprise swarm attack while 
keeping combatant ships behind for major engagement with the PLAN 
amphibious assault force. 
xvi 
• Combatant ships placed at the front line for major engagement with small 
missile craft placed behind to provide fire support and a follow-on 
counterattack against the PLAN amphibious assault force. 
• A mixed-force configuration of combatant ships and small missile craft. 
The secondary question is: if Taiwan’s current force is not sufficient to meet the 
PLAN breakpoint, how much force is needed to achieve the goal? 
To address the research questions, simulation software is used to build robust 
scenarios to simulate a maritime campaign between the ROCN and the PLAN. The 
opposing force (OPFOR) is the presumed PLAN force, which is composed of  
30 amphibious landing craft, also known as high-value targets (HVTs), 10 destroyers, and 
60 frigates. The defense force (DEFOR) is the ROCN force, which is composed of  
4 destroyers, 23 frigates and 43 small missile craft. The small missile craft in the DEFOR 
is an unconventional maritime platform that is designed to be of small size, have high 
maneuverability, with a low radar-cross-section. The small missile craft carries the same 
anti-surface cruise missile that combatant ships are equipped with, but with low operational 
and maintenance costs. The small missile craft has limited organic sensor capabilities and 
relies on information shared by the combatant ships. A total of 12 scenarios were studied 
based on the three basic DEFOR’s CONOPs by using two different tactics and under two 
communication situations. The two tactics are preemptive and island-masking defense 
tactics. The two communication situations are whether the DEFOR is allowed to share 
information between combatant ships or not; situation one does not allows the DEFOR to 
use data-sharing capabilities while situation 2 allows the DEFOR to use data-sharing 







Table ES-1: Scenarios Reference Table 
  Tactic1: Preemptive Tactic2: Island-masking 
CONOPS1 Situation 1: C1T1S1 (scenario 1)  C1T2S1 (scenario 4) 
Situation 2  C1T1S2 (scenario 7) C1T2S2 (scenario 10) 
CONOPS2 Situation 1  C2T1S1 (scenario 2) C2T2S1 (scenario 5) 
Situation 2  C2T1S2 (scenario 8) C2T2S2 (scenario 11) 
CONOPS3 Situation 1  C3T1S1 (scenario 3) C3T2S1 (scenario 6) 
Situation 2  C3T1S2 (scenario 9) C3T2S2 (scenario 12) 
 
The settings for the OPFOR are fixed across all scenarios, such as its force 
configuration, tactics, and capabilities. Figure ES-1 shows scenario 1, where the OPFOR 
is invading from the left-hand side while the DEFOR is defending from the right-hand side.  
 
 
The force configuration of the opposing force is fixed. The OPFOR destroyers are colored pink, 
frigates are colored red, and HVTs are marked as red cross. DEFOR is positioned on the right side 
of the map with destroyers colored blue, frigates colored green, and small missile craft colored 
yellow.  
Figure ES-1  Scenario 1 layout 
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Data farming techniques are used to produce a large amount of data through the 
employment of high-performance computers and advanced design of experiments. These 
techniques allow a wide range of variables to be analyzed, such as the DEFOR’s force 
numbers, in order to find the optimal strategy for the DEFOR to meet the PLAN breakpoint 
from many possible outcomes. A total of 6,120 campaigns were simulated to explore the 
optimal strategy and force configuration for the ROCN. The PLAN breakpoint in this thesis 
is 10 HVTs killed, in other words, the PLAN invasion is neutralized when they lose 10 
HVTs.  
The analysis reveals that the mixed force CONOPs with preemptive tactics under 
the data-sharing situation produce maximum benefit to the ROCN in defending against the 
PLAN. By using this strategy, the ROCN is able to achieve a 70% PLAN’s breakpoint on 
average. 
There is a trade-off between frigates and small missile craft for the DEFOR in 
achieving the PLAN breakpoint. The analysis suggests that the optimal strategy for the 
DEFOR to achieve a 70% PLAN breakpoint rate requires either four destroyers, 23 frigates, 
and 95 small missile craft; or four destroyers, 33 frigates, and 26 small missile craft. The 
more frigates employed, the less small missile craft are needed to achieve the mission goal, 
but the small missile craft has an economical advantage over the larger vessels, and also 
requires less manpower. A small missile craft only requires two to four personnel per vessel, 
while the frigates require at least 120 personnel to achieve combat readiness. 
The following recommendation are made by combining the results and insights 
from the analysis of 6,120 simulated campaigns.  
• In order to maximize the small missile boats advantage, mix combatant 
ships and small missile craft together to fight in concert.  
• To best utilize an asymmetric force advantage, a data-sharing capability 
needs to be present.  
xix 
• The needs and the advantages of the small-missile craft should be 
addressed in order to build an asymmetric force structure to provide an 
effective defense within Taiwan’s economic constraints. 
This thesis provides analytical results and insights into the optimal employment of 
an asymmetric force for the ROCN to defend against a large-scale PLAN invasion based 
on a specific geographic and scenario setting. The results and the methodology from this 
thesis can support the ROCN’s future force configuration development.  
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A. OVERVIEW  
The fact that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is becoming one of the world’s 
superpowers is an inconvenient truth. Its unprecedented economic and military growth 
make it an unmatched player in the greater Indo-Pacific region. Since President Xi Jinping 
took office in the year 2012, he has enacted a “China Dream” policy. This policy includes 
many measures intended to make the PRC more influential in the global community with 
respect to politics and economics. To fulfill this objective, China imposed economic 
sanctions on certain nations, increased defense spending, enacted military and combat-
theater reforms, and enforced bureaucratic anti-corruption practices. The PRC has also 
enacted the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with the goal of national rejuvenation, which 
is raising concerns for neighboring countries as well as the United States regarding regional 
stability and prosperity. All of these measures reveal the PRC’s expansionist ideology. 
President Xi has also made sovereignty claims on the East Sea and the South China 
Sea (SCS) regions, which has raised tensions with neighboring countries. China has 
enacted more military patrols and surveillance activities in these regions. This indicates 
that there is an increased capability of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to 
conduct patrol and maritime surveillance in blue water for longer periods of time.  
Taiwan possesses a unique position in the sea line of communication (SLOC) which 
connects the PRC to the Pacific Ocean. Due to the strategic location of Taiwan, it is 
considered a primary defense/attack area. Many studies, including New Frontier 
Foundation Defense Policy Advisory Committee (2014) and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (2019) reveal concerns about the PRC’s rising naval power and also attempt to 
predict PLA invasion strategies and force configurations. However, few studies conduct 
analysis on the PLAN’s amphibious attack force. The PRC is now building the Type 075 
amphibious assault ship, which is comparable to an America-class amphibious assault ship. 
This indicates PRC’s intention of preparing for a large landing operation in the future. 
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Combat modeling has been used by militaries around the world for over 40 years 
to explore capability gaps between forces. “Simulating contingency operations against an 
enemy whose intentions, doctrine, tactics and equipment are as yet unknown is the most 
important challenge that combat simulators face” (Appleget 1995, p.704). As Appleget 
suggested, the experience gained from simulations can be helpful in decision making for 
future field operations. A large-scale force analysis could be achieved by conducting high-
level, low-resolution simulations in wargaming and campaign analysis. Although this 
analysis has its limitations, researchers can still gain insight on force capability to better 
prepare for future operations.  
B. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Following a civil war, the Republic of China (ROC) separated from the PRC and 
established an independent government on Taiwan in 1949. Since then, the PRC has never 
given up on the idea of seizing Taiwan, peacefully or militarily. China’s “One China 
Principle,” says there is only one unified China that can be recognized. This does not 
include Taiwan as an independent Republic of China. China officials have claimed several 
times that the PLA will take any measure necessary, including a military invasion, to 
achieve unification. At a regional security conference in 2019, Chinese Defense Minister 
Wei Fenghe said, “If anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military has no 
choice but to fight at all costs for national unity” (Westcott 2019). Therefore, the threat of 
a Chinese invasion of Taiwan never eases, and Taiwan must constantly prepare for new 
threats. 
Specifically, the Taiwan Strait has been under threat ever since the PRC established 
a capable navy. The PRC has tried to threaten Taiwan three times over the Taiwan Strait, 
but Taiwan was able to neutralize the threat each time because of its sea supremacy 
supported by the United States under the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty. Recently, 
Taiwan’s sea control capabilities have been challenged as the PRC is growing its military 
capabilities.  
The PRC’s PLAN has grown dramatically in both size and power over the past two 
decades. They now have newer generations of destroyers, nuclear-powered submarines, 
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advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, and self-developed 
shipboard combat systems that China claims rival the U.S. Navy’s AEGIS combat system. 
The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has also improved its multi-warhead 
ballistic missiles, increasing their range to the point that they can reach the West Coast of 
the North American continent. This implies that all of Taiwan is under the threat of attack 
and indicates unbalanced military power on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
ISR sites and anti-surface missile sites established on islands across the Taiwan 
Strait provide a confident defense system; however, the lack of strategic depth is one of the 
weak spots that Taiwan should address. Maritime interdiction is more vital than many 
currently acknowledge. If an invasion is initiated by the PLA, they will likely first seek to 
take air supremacy from ROCArf, then the PLA will likely seek to neutralize Taiwanese 
ISR sites. With a lack of Taiwanese defenses in place, the PLAN will likely to initiate an 
amphibious assault. The invasion force will likely possess overwhelming ground forces, 
including mechanized ground troops who will likely have a large advantage in an invasion 
of Taiwan. The PLAN amphibious assault task force will likely employ a large number of 
amphibious landing crafts, destroyers, and frigates, seeking to gain maritime superiority in 
the Taiwan Strait for the PRC. 
Although the PLAN has a substantial numerical advantage, its weapon reliability 
and effectiveness have never been demonstrated in battle. The ROCN will be facing an 
unprecedented challenge if the PRC takes action. Many studies including (Joe 2019) and 
(Westcott 2019) have focused on the relationship between Taiwan and the PRC over the 
Taiwan Strait on the strategic level. A few of them deeply discuss the PLAN task force 
invasion breakpoint. Today, the ROCN is losing its advantage to the PLAN. The ROCN’s 
operational capabilities and force configuration need to be reevaluated to prepare for 
confronting the Chinese threats in the future. Taiwan cannot afford to build up the same 
military capabilities that the PRC has; therefore, developing asymmetric capabilities may 
allow Taiwan the flexibility to defeat a cross-strait invasion within its economic and 
military constraints. Completing a breakpoint analysis on a PLAN amphibious assault force 
invasion will provide insight to help examine the capability gap between the ROCN and 
the PLAN, as well as support a solution to build a better ROCN defense capability. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis focuses on a potential PLAN invasion of Taiwan. The following thesis 
questions are developed regarding the optimal ROCN concept of operations (CONOPS), 
and defensive strategy against a large-scale PLAN amphibious invasion. 
The primary question is: given Taiwan’s available military force, which of the three 
CONOPS listed below would be optimal to use to bring the PLAN amphibious assault 
force to its breakpoint?  
• Place small missile craft upfront to conduct a surprise swarm attack while 
keeping combatant ships behind for major engagement with the PLAN 
amphibious assault force. 
• Combatant ships placed at the front line for major engagement with small 
missile craft placed behind to provide fire support and a follow-on 
counterattack against the PLAN amphibious assault force. 
• A mixed-force configuration of combatant ships and small missile craft. 
The secondary question is: if Taiwan’s current force is not sufficient to meet the 
PLAN breakpoint, how much force is needed to achieve the goal? 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
All data employed in this thesis are from open and unclassified sources such as 
(Jane’s 2019) and subject matter experts. Any conclusions from this thesis are intended for 
academic use only. This thesis provides insight into possible defense against a large 
amphibious attack. The PRC amphibious assault task force is composed of 25 to 30 
amphibious landing craft escorted by 60 destroyers and frigates. The ROCN defense force 
is configured with destroyers, frigates, large patrol crafts (PCGs), and fast attack missile 
boats (FACGs). The objective of the ROCN is to neutralize the invasion by achieving the 
PLAN’s breakpoint. 
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E. BENEFIT OF STUDY 
Breakpoint analysis is aimed to understand combat capabilities regarding the two 
opposing forces in order to identify the level of attrition required to meet the stopping 
condition. This is based on commander’s intent, mission requirement, or political concerns 
behind the scenes. Real-world fighting is different from what is seen in simulations and 
video games, as there is a human decision-making factor to be considered. A “fight to the 
last man” battle is not the primary concept in field operations owing to the value of human 
life. To showcase this, advanced technology and unmanned vehicles have been developed 
to lower the human casualty loss. Due to breakpoints and commander’s intent, a successful 
mission can be accomplished by achieving a certain level of adversary casualties while 
maintaining a certain friendly force level for follow-on missions. Thus, the simulations 
being used for breakpoint analysis attempt to determine the end of the conflict between two 
large opposing forces by using simulation tools to calculate Measures of Performance 
(MOPs) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs). This will provide insight regarding 
adversary weaknesses as well as areas for improvement in order to promote the force 
capability under the given constraints or alternatives.  
Breakpoint analysis on a PLAN amphibious assault invasion will help to gain a 
better understanding of the military gap between the PLAN and the ROCN. An optimal 
CONOP could be revealed by analyzing simulation output, which could lead to 
recommendations to unanswered questions. Finally, this thesis can provide a better 
understanding in determining proper force configurations for the ROCN to effectively deter 
the PLAN from future sea battles. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
This research employs Map Aware Non-uniform Automata Version V (MANA V), 
software (McIntosh et al., 2007) used to simulate a large-scale maritime amphibious assault 
environment and engagement as well as possible defense force tactics. Data analysis 
techniques are used as well to explore insights from the model outcomes in order to answer 
the research questions. 
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The research involves building a model that serves as a large-scale amphibious 
assault environment. The opposing force (OPFOR) represents the PLAN, and is assigned 
the colors red and pink. It is composed of 30 amphibious landing crafts, which represent 
high value targets (HVTs) escorted by 10 destroyers and 50 frigates. The defensive force 
(DEFOR) represents the ROCN, and is assigned the colors blue, yellow, and green. 
DEFOR is composed of four destroyers, 23 frigates, and 43 small fast-attack missile boats 
(FACGs) and large patrol crafts (PCGs). The model simulates how a defensive force 
defends against a large amphibious attack force with long-range surface-to-surface missiles 
using different defensive tactics in specific communication situations. A data-sharing 
capability is enabled for the OPFOR, but is limited for the DEFOR in some situations. 
A total of 12 scenarios are developed that extend three basic CONOPS in order to 
understand the DEFOR using specific defensive tactics in specific communication 
situations. Missile hit probability and radar degradation principles are implemented to 
better reflect real-world maritime combat realities. Island coastal terrain barriers are 
employed to prevent ships from sailing onto the island. An island-masking feature is 
implemented to simulate that ships can neither see each other nor engage with each other 
over the island.  
Multiple runs were conducted of each scenario. Quantitative data was recorded and 
collected from each run for both OPFOR and DEFOR. These data include specific 
platforms’ loss and time step from each run of the scenarios.  
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II. ANALYTICAL TOOLS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. DESCRIPTION OF ANALYTIC TOOLS 
Two software programs were considered for this study: Map Awareness Non-
uniform Automata (MANA) version V model software and JMP statistical analysis 
software. 
1. MANA  
MANA is an agent-based, time stepped, stochastic, distillation model software that 
was developed by New Zealand’s Defense Technology Agency. For this research, a time 
step of 10 seconds was used. It is an effective simulation tool for military operations 
analysis. The MANA software has been used in a wide range of national and international 
defense studies across different types of operations and service branches. There are a wide 
range of studies using MANA software at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) including 
the following. 
• Abbott, Benjamin P (2008) “Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission Packages: 
Determining The Best Mix.”  
• Kang, Wei Sheng (2017) “An Engineered Resupply System for Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations.”  
• Kaya, Serif (2016) “Evaluating Effectiveness of a Frigate in an Anti-air Warfare 
(AAW) Environment.” 
• Sikandar, Raja (2016) “Analysis of Protection Measures for Naval Vessels 
Berthed at Harbor Against Terrorist Attacks.”  
• Zaman Khan, Akhtar (2017) “Convoy Protection under Multi-threat Scenario” 
The above mentioned theses reveal that MANA software is a favored tool to help 
with modeling operations in various domains at NPS.  
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a. Agent Behavior  
MANA allows analysts to leave out detailed physical attributes of the agent if they 
are not relevant to the study. MANA enables analysts to explore a large number of scenario 
excursions within a reasonable timeframe (McIntosh et al. 2007, p1). The agents’ 
properties in MANA can be defined based on user-defined inputs within limitations for 
designed scenarios. Agents act autonomously, sensing their environment and adversaries, 
as defined by the user, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Users can define agent attributes such as moving logic, which is the agent’s tendency to move 
toward the adversary or friendly force or waypoint, etcetera. 
Figure 1. Agent Property Window in MANA  
By modifying agents’ personalities, users are able to define how agents move, 
defend, attack, and perform similar operations. Agents can be programmed to be either 
aggressive or docile in the face of the enemy. Users determine how agents react to enemy 
forces, friendly forces, and specific classes of agents, or move toward a predefined 
destination. Agents’ features can be altered in terms of organic concealment, armor 
thickness, moving pattern, searching mode, target firing priority, weapon capabilities, and 
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sensor performance. Situational awareness sharing is another advantage of MANA that 
allows agents to share perceived information with other specified agents. Thus, an agent 
can perceive the presence of the enemy by using inorganic situational awareness 
information. The data-sharing capabilities within ship platforms in this thesis was 
implemented through these specific MANA functions. 
The benefit of using MANA is that the user can explore various scenario designs 
on their personal computer within a short timeframe. MANA’s setting flexibility enables 
designers to capture valuable characteristics of real-world military entities for analytical 
use. MANA does carry some constraints that affect this study, with the workarounds listed 
as follows. 
• The agents cannot employ dynamic waypoints, which prevent us from 
simulating some maritime defense tactics. Variations of agent searching 
modes, attacking preferences, and personalities were used to compensate. 
• Missiles can neither readily use waypoints nor be assigned specific speeds. 
Missile stochastic probability of hit and kill are determined to represent 
real-world maritime missile engagement. 
b. Terrain Features 
MANA is capable of simulating terrain, creating real-world features such as 
hilltops, rivers, and walls. These features can affect an agent’s maneuverability, vision, and 
weapon protection. In the base model, vital terrain features were introduced to simulate the 
maritime environment. Hilltops were introduced to simulate islands, walls were introduced 
to simulate coast lines, and other specific terrain was introduced to simulate coastal areas. 
The islands block enemy view, so agents can use them for defense or surprise attacks. The 
wall function provided by MANA is used to prevent ships from sailing onto the land. The 
coastal area provides 70% concealment, degrading the enemy’s capability of seeing agents 
in the coastal areas. These features work together to simulate island-masking tactics in 
littorals, which is common in naval warfare. Figure 2 depicts the terrain created. 
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The scenario map editor in MANA allows user to define specific terrain features. Customized 
terrains are available to meet the user’s specific requirements.  
Figure 2. MANA Terrain Editor 
2. JMP Software 
JMP (https://www.jmp.com/en_us/home.html) is data analysis software that allows 
users to explore data and capture significant statistical factors. Its powerful functions allow 
data analysts to build regressions and discover interactions between various factors. It has 
a graphic tool that allows users to generate informative and easily readable charts of the 
experiment’s results. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous studies, including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) force report 
(Office of the Secretary of Defense 2019) were reviewed before framing the initial interest 
and to build the research questions. These studies cover the PLAN force structure report, 
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possible invasion strategies, force capabilities, future policies, and force limitations. The 
following literature review provides guidance to the research. Their insights contribute to 
the thesis scope and model set-up. Additionally, their approaches toward the problem and 
methodologies used to analyze the operational effectiveness of various naval task force 
configurations were adapted to some extent.  
Chapter 7 of New Frontier Foundation Defense Policy Advisory Committee (2014) 
provides details about the PLAN’s current fleet, weapons, C4ISR capabilities, and its 
possible future fleet configuration. It confirms that the PLA’s sea control capabilities 
surpass those of Taiwan. The report highlights the importance of ROCN maritime units as 
the last organized line of defense to Taiwan. If the Taiwanese maritime defense is 
neutralized, the PLA is likely to be unstoppable in invading Taiwan. The PLA could then 
confront Japan, which could lead China to challenge the U.S. influence and interest in the 
Asia-Pacific area. Observations reveal the PLAN’s newly developed destroyers, data-link 
capabilities, anti-submarine warfare limitations, and its presumed force configuration. The 
report contains insightful observations and reinforces the importance of ROCN interdiction 
of the PLAN’s amphibious task force.  
Chapter 1 of Office of the Secretary of Defense (2019) specifies that Taiwan 
persistently remains in China’s strategic interest identified by leadership as a geographic 
location having strategic importance. PLAN’s focus on joint amphibious exercises in the 
eastern theater, including exercises with amphibious mechanized infantry brigades, 
suggests its intention for a large-scale amphibious landing mission in the future. Chapter 3 
reveals China’s strategy and capability in regard to the Taiwan Strait. Multiple courses of 
action are considered for China to unify Taiwan through political action, media 
propaganda, economic sanctions, cyber-attacks, and a large-scale military invasion. 
Chapter 3 discusses the PLAN’s constraints and limitations regarding large-scale 
amphibious assault in many aspects, particularly in regard to the integration gap between 
PLAN and People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine (PLANM) force. The contents are 
insightful points of view and contribute to the assumptions of the simulation model in this 
thesis.  
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Gilbert (2011) uses ARENA simulation software, an activity-based discrete event 
simulation (DES) software, and Lanchester equations to explore the number of jet fighter 
necessary for U.S. air superiority. His model explores various influential factors that impact 
the campaign result such as force numbers, sensor detecting range, weapon shooting range, 
electronic attack (EA) degradation of missile effectiveness, etc. The author developed three 
force-on-force scenarios by varying Lanchester attrition based on specific adversaries’ 
conditions. The U.S. airforce versus adversaries with varying levels of technology and 
force numbers includes:  
• The U.S. against Venezuela (small force with low technology),  
• The U.S. against Iran (medium force with middle technology), and 
• The U.S. against China’s air force (large force with high technology). 
Gilbert’s study concludes that fighter numbers and superior technology would 
impact the campaign result. His study provides insight into various factors to be considered 
for a force-on-force campaign. However, force configuration and disposition in the 
scenario were limited and neither force alternatives nor larger force sizes were considered. 
Navy and Air Force campaigns share much similarity regarding the engagement aspect. 
Gilbert’s study contributes to the methodology of the analysis in this thesis work.  
Abbott (2008) used MANA software, design of experiments (DOE) techniques, and 
JMP statistic software to explore the influential factors for optimal littoral combat ship 
(LCS) squadron configurations by mission type. Abbott explored three scenarios over a 
real-world map of 335 × 225 nautical miles to represent three different LCS mission types: 
Surface warfare (SUW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Mine Warfare (MIW). The 
scenario is to dispatch an LCS squadron to clear safe passage for a Carrier Strike Group 
(CSG) waiting behind to transit a strait under the three previous mentioned threats in which 
he varied LCS mission modules and LCS numbers to find the optimal squadron 
configuration under a multi-threat environment. The initial deploying position and 
waypoints for each LCS vessel in the scenario vary depend on the mission types to better 
reflect real-world naval war-fighting. Terrain barriers were modeled as well to prevent 
maritime vessels from sailing onto land. The hilltop feature simulates island masking; e.g., 
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two ships cannot detect or shoot each other over a peninsula. Abbott provides insight into 
the optimal LCS squadron size and force configuration by mission types respectively, such 
as “a composition of five LCS configured for the primary threat and two LCS configured 
for the perceived secondary threat serves as a compositional rule of thumb” (Abbott  2008). 
Other factors besides force number were also explored, such as weapon and sensor system 
performance by DOE technique. Abbott’s effort is limited to small-scale campaign 
Zaman Khan (2017) used MANA to simulate maritime convoy defense under a 
multi-threat environment, specific to torpedo and anti-surface cruise missiles (ASCMs) 
from submarine and surface combatants. Akhtar explored robust and effective defense 
screen disposition tactics for surface combatants to protect high-value-targets (HVTs) in 
convoy missions. In addition to Blue Force convoy defense tactics evaluation, adversary’s 
attacking tactics and weapon employment were evaluated, as well as finding robust tactics 
to best attack the convoy. A 540 × 540 nautical mile area of operation was considered to 
be the scenario background map. The blue force convoy was in the defense posture to 
accomplish the logistic task configured with HVTs, submarine, and surface combatant 
ships equipped with anti-subsurface helicopters. Tactically Exploited Reconnaissance 
Nodes (TERN) and Medium Displacement Unmanned Surface Vessels (MDUSV) were 
modeled along with Blue Force configuration. The Red force was configured with only 
surface combatant ships and submarines. Data-sharing links between submarines and 
surface combatant ships was limited. Thirty-six different tactical scenarios were developed 
to explore robust offensive and defensive tactics for both the Blue and Red force. Measures 
of performance (MOPs) were employed to determine influential factors such as defense 
options, weapon range, single shot kill rates, etc. Nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube 
(NOLH) designs were employed along with MOPs to gain good statistical properties for 
better analysis results. Akhtar focused on convoy defense deployment tactics under a multi-
threat environment, but is limited to a small-scale force level. His work contributes to the 
amphibious attack task force concept in this thesis. 
Even supposing that none of these studies directly reviewed and explored large-
scale counter amphibious attack task force defense, they provide insight regarding the 
correlation between factors and combat effectiveness, and how to find the influential 
14 
factors which have impact on the campaign result. The importance of the analytical 
methodology and the simulation software employed was also emphasized in this specific 
force-on-force operation. 
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III. MODEL AND SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to understand the ROCN defense against a potential large-scale PLAN 
amphibious invasion across the Taiwan Strait, it is necessary to develop robust model 
scenarios that contain geographic features and simulate organic force capabilities for both 
PLAN and ROCN forces. This chapter describes 12 scenarios and reveals assumptions for 
both OPFOR and DEFOR capabilities in order to better demonstrate the scenario 
development process. A description of the MANA software settings is provided as well to 
demonstrate how force limitations and operational concepts are implemented in each 
model. Lastly, descriptions are provided to show how the models are built and how the 
agents behave in the models.  
B. MODEL CONCEPT 
The baseline model depends on the defensive force structure. There are two 
platforms in the defensive force: combatant ships and small missile craft. Combatant ships 
are composed of destroyers and frigates, while small missile craft are composed of large 
guided-missile patrol craft (PCGs) and small guided-missile fast-attack missile boats 
(FACGs). The DEFOR was varied by positioning combatant ships and small missile craft 
in three different configurations to explore the operational effectiveness of the invasion 
defense.  
1. CONOPS 1: Small Missile Craft Forward 
In CONOPS 1, small missile craft are positioned upfront as a swarm attack force 
and combatant ships are positioned behind as a supporting force. Small missile craft have 
the same missile capability as combatant ships, but lack radar detection capability. This 
means small missile craft have limited target detection and recognition capability; 
however, they enjoy stealth capabilities because of their small size, unique superstructure 
which reflects a low radar cross section signal, and special paint that absorbs the radar 
signal. The other important feature of small missile craft is their maneuvering flexibility 
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and deployment speed. For instance, FACGs can maneuver up to 35 nautical miles per hour 
(35 knots). This force configuration is meant to allow small missile craft to use their 
numerical advantage and stealth to conduct a swarm attack, while combatant ships are 
positioned behind for major engagement. Figure 4 shows Force Configuration 1. In this 
model, destroyers are colored blue, frigates are colored green, and small missile craft are 
colored yellow.  
 
The force configuration of the opposing force is fixed. The OPFOR destroyers are colored pink, 
frigates are colored red, and HVTs are marked as red crosses. The DEFOR is positioned on the 
right side of the map with destroyers colored blue, frigates colored green, and small missile craft 
colored yellow.  
Figure 3. CONOPS 1  
2. CONOPS 2: Combatant Ships Forward 
In CONNOPS 2, the positioning order is reversed, with major combatant ships 
forward as an attacking force and small missile craft positioned behind as a reserve force. 
By positioning combatant ships at the front line, combatant ships are expected to provide 
early warning for small missile craft that have limited radar detection and recognition 
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capability. Meanwhile, small missile craft are expected to provide joint fire support and 
conduct a follow-on attack to better defend against the large-scale opposing force.  
 
The force configuration of the OPFOR remains the same. The OPFOR destroyers are colored pink, 
frigates are colored red, and HVTs are marked as red crosses. The DEFOR is positioned on the 
right side of the map, with destroyers colored blue, frigates colored green, and small missile craft 
colored in yellow.  
Figure 4. CONOPS 2  
3. CONOPS 3: Mixed Forces 
In CONOPS 3, a mixed-force configuration is introduced by evenly distributing 
both DEFOR combatant ships and small missile craft as a defense force so that the two 
platforms operate in concert to defend against the OPFOR.  
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The force configuration of the OPFOR remains the same. The OPFOR destroyers are colored pink, 
frigates are colored red, and HVTs are marked as red crosses. The DEFOR is positioned on the 
right side of the map, with destroyers colored blue, frigates colored green, and small missile craft 
colored in yellow.  
Figure 5. CONOPS 3  
These three CONOPS represent three different operational concepts for the 
defensive force. The number of vessels for both defensive and opposing forces are fixed. 
The DEFOR is composed of 27 total destroyers and frigates and 43 total PCGs and FACGs. 
The OPFOR is composed of 10 destroyers, 60 frigates, and 30 amphibious landing craft. 
Of note, the amphibious landing craft are also designated as high value targets (HVTs). 
The objective of this research is to explore potential operational effectiveness for the 
DEFOR by applying various asymmetric force configurations and defensive tactics. 
Combatant ships, such as destroyers and frigates, are well known for their lethal missile 
capability, dominating radar detection, target recognition, and data-sharing capabilities. 
These capabilities are vital to modern maritime warfare; however, it is expensive for a 
naval force conducting littoral operations to operate and maintain combatant ships. 
Accordingly, the addition of a new platform concept such as FACGs provides a solution. 
FACGs have the same lethality as combatant ships, low radar cross section signal, higher 
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maneuverability, and greater stealth capabilities. This new platform concept introduces the 
use of an asymmetric force in modern maritime warfare. Conventional combatant ships 
still dominate in maritime warfare across the globe; however, in a battle environment that 
lacks strategic depth, such as the Taiwan Strait, an asymmetric force structure is more 
effective and economical than using solely conventional combatant ships. In addition to 
force configurations, defensive tactics, such as preemptive actions and island masking, are 
introduced into the scenarios to explore their operational effectiveness. Additionally, the 
DEFOR’s communication capabilities are varied in the model scenarios to better 
understand their impact on combat results. These tactics and adjustments are integrated 
into force configurations to identify the best overall defensive strategy for the DEFOR. 
C. SCENARIO BACKGROUND  
There are 12 scenarios which were developed to extend the three force 
configurations in order to understand the DEFOR’s use of specific defensive tactics in 
different communication situations. All of these scenarios are limited to surface threats 
only for both the DEFOR and OPFOR. All scenarios share the same scenario background: 
the PLAN is known as the opposing force (OPFOR), which tries to conduct a large-scale 
amphibious invasion across the Taiwan Strait subsequent to an attack on Taiwan involving 
PLA air strikes and disablement of C4ISR. In this amphibious invasion, the objective of 
the PLAN is to transport to the designated landing spots key military hardware, personnel, 
and supplies, such as heavy mechanized vehicles, ground forces, and ammunition. The 
PLAN amphibious landing spot is assumed to be located in the south of Taiwan because 
of a major naval harbor, useful military facilities, and beaches suitable for landing heavy 
mechanized ground forces. The area of operation (AOO) is considered to be 150 × 70 nm, 
and it is located between southern Taiwan and mainland China. In this scenario, it is 
assumed that naval maritime platforms are the only suitable resource available for Taiwan 
to counter the PLA invasion. The OPFOR then launches a large-scale amphibious task 
force toward Taiwan. The objective of the DEFOR is to defend against the OPFOR by 
deploying an asymmetric force composed of destroyers, frigates, PCGs, and FACGs. 
Figure 6 shows the base scenario layout of the OPFOR and DEFOR. The OPFOR is colored 
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in red and pink. The DEFOR is colored in yellow, green, and blue according to the platform 
type.  
  
In the base scenario, the PLAN amphibious invasion force is heading to the east to the designated 
landing spot, which is located in the south of Taiwan. The DEFOR is positioned around the Peng-
Hu archipelagos and is ready to defend against the PLA invasion.  
Figure 6. Base Scenario  
D. OPFOR  
The OPFOR is assumed to have a principal invasion strategy of transporting its 
vital logistic support, while deploying 30 amphibious landing craft, 10 destroyers, and 60 
frigates for the amphibious operation. The destroyers and the frigates are defined as the 
escorting force and are positioned around the vulnerable amphibious crafts (HVTs) in order 
to assure successful transportation. The entire OPFOR maneuvers at a speed of 15 knots 
toward the south of Taiwan. The escorting force, such as destroyers and frigates, searches 
for and engages any potential adversary targets within their maneuvering direction, while 
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also neutralizing any threats that come from Taiwan that could jeopardize the safety of the 
HVTs. The OPFOR is assumed to have full data-sharing capabilities; thus, this capability 
is enabled for the entire OPFOR to allow individual units to share information regarding 
detected targets. In other words, the OPFOR’s combatant ships can either fire based on 
their own organic sensor information or fire based on communicated information shared 
by their counterparts. This is meant to simulate fire support tactics and to reflect modern 
real-world naval warfighting.  
E. OPFOR COMBATANT SHIP CAPABILITIES  
Surface combatants are included in the OPFOR model’s escorting force. These 
platforms reflect the following PLAN ships: Luyang II-class destroyers (Type 052C), 
Jiangkai II-class frigates (Type 054A), Jiangwei II-class frigates (Type 053H3), and 
Jiangdao-class corvettes (Type 056). The OPFOR escorting force platforms’ capabilities 
and features are described in the following section. 
a. Maneuverability 
The entire amphibious assault task force is assigned to a speed of 15 nautical miles 
per hour (knots) as a standard cruising speed. The maximum speed for the escorting force 
is limited to 25 knots for contingency situations, such as enemy contacts and engagements.  
b. Radar Detection and Classification Probability  
Radar capabilities reflect the PLAN’s Seagull family (Type 364) surface search 
radar with a maximum range of 100 kilometers for the entire contingent of OPFOR 
combatant ships. A degradation principle is adopted to simulate the probability of target 
detection and recognition to reflect real-world maritime warfighting. These probabilities 
are independent with time steps in MANA software. Table 1 shows the OPFOR’s radar 





 Radar Range Detection and Classification Probability for 
the OPFOR Combatant Ships 
Range (km) 40 45 50 60 70 90 90 100 
Detection/Classification 
Probability 
0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
An OPFOR’s combatant ship’s radar has an 80% probability to detect a surface target and 
has another 80% probability to be able to recognize and classify the target at a distance of 40 
km. 
 
c. Anti-Surface Cruise Missile (ASCMs) Feature and Attacking Tactics 
ASCM characteristics for the OPFOR are described in the following section. 
(1) Shooting Range: The maximum ASCM firing range of the OPFOR is 
determined to be 100 km; however, missiles are be launched unless a target 
is confirmed. Therefore, the effective shooting range is determined to be 
between 40 to 100 km.  
(2) Capacity: There are two types of platforms defined in the OPFOR’s 
escorting force: destroyers and frigates. Destroyers are determined to have 
eight ASCMs. Due to the variety of frigates that the PLAN has, seven 
ASCMs were averaged for each of those platforms to reflect the OPFOR’s 
frigate missile capacity.  
(3) Probability of Missile Hit: The probability of missile hit for the OPFOR 
combatant ships’ ASCM is set at 0.7 across all ranges.  
(4) Number of Shots to Kill: A number of two shots to kill an OPFOR’s 
platform is defined in the model.  
(5) Target Priority: The escorting force’s mission is to deter the threat from the 
DEFOR and to provide protection for the HVTs; therefore, their prioritized 
target is hostile destroyers, with frigates as secondary targets, and small 
missile craft as the last consideration.  
 
F. DEFOR  
The objective of the DEFOR is to defend against a large-scale OPFOR invasion by 
deploying an asymmetric naval force that includes destroyers, frigates, and a combination 
of PCGs and FACGs. The three DEFOR configurations have been explained at the 
beginning of this chapter. Two more defensive tactic options as well as two force 
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communication limitations are taken into account to explore the DEFOR’s maximum 
operational effectiveness in defending against the OPFOR. The 12 scenarios comes from 
all combinations of the DEFOR’s configurations, tactics options, and communication 
limitations. Those tactics and force limitations are introduced in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
1. Preemptive Defense Tactics — T1 
In this defensive tactic, the DEFOR actively searches and engages the enemy 
instead of passively waiting for their arrival. Once the scenarios start, the DEFOR 
maneuvers toward the enemy position in order to conduct a surprise counter-attack before 
the OPFOR discovers the DEFOR.  
2. Island-Masking Defense Tactics — T2 
In the island-masking defensive tactic, the concept of concealment is introduced. 
In the model, there is an offshore archipelago composed of several small islands that are 
located near the midway point of the Taiwan Strait. These small islands provide perfect 
concealment for the DEFOR. Finding a target is not always an easy task in naval warfare. 
Although modern combatant ships have the most advanced surface searching radar, there 
are still many influential factors that degrade radar effectiveness, such as sea state, low 
clouds, humidity, and coastal line terrain. The complexity of coastal terrain provides a 
perfect camouflage for the DEFOR; thus, this feature gives the OPFOR difficulty in 
detecting DEFOR ships. The concealment is programmed to provide 70% concealment for 
DEFOR platforms in order to simulate island-masking effectiveness.  That is, the 
probabilities of detection for OPFOR combatants is reduced by 70%. 
3. Communication Jammed Situation — S1  
In this communication situation, limited communication capabilities of the DEFOR 
are introduced to simulate a complex electromagnetic environment. Electronic warfare has 
become prevalent in modern naval warfare. It can be used as a countermeasure for 
incoming hostile missiles, target detection, and to cause negative impacts on the 
adversary’s communication. Communication is vital to naval warfare. This principle 
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applies to both the OPFOR and DEFOR. Thusly, whoever confirms the targets first can 
initiate the attack; therefore, an effective intelligence exchange and an effective 
communication channel is important. By having good data-sharing capabilities, ships can 
save a large of amount of time on target verification; therefore, they do not need to spend 
time on searching targets if the validated target information is passed from allies or a 
friendly force. The less time spent on searching and confirming the adversary, the higher 
probability you can defeat the adversary.  
The PLAN is assumed to have capabilities to launch electromagnetic measures such 
as an electronic attack to interfere with the DEFOR’s communications; therefore, this 
situation is aimed at exploring the operational effectiveness of the DEFOR under a 
communication jammed situation. In other words, every DEFOR’s platform has to perceive 
the enemy by their organic radar equipment. No information exchange is allowed for 
DEFOR platforms in this type of situation. The concept of this model is to understand the 
impact on the DEFOR’s operational effectiveness under a communication being jammed 
situation.  
4. Perfect Communications Situation — S2    
In this communication situation, data-sharing capabilities are introduced to the 
DEFOR that allows information exchange between platforms. This concept assumes the 
PLAN does not have advanced technology to conduct electronic warfare tactics, such as 
an electromagnetic attack on the DEFOR; therefore, the DEFOR can utilize the data-
sharing capabilities between various platforms perfectly. The DEFOR small missile craft 
are thus able to perceive the presence of the adversary beyond the line-of-sight by receiving 
situational awareness from its counterparts: the combatant ships with advanced radars, or 
any platforms that identifies the enemy ships first, can pass that information to the rest of 
the group; this shortens the entire DEFOR’s reaction time to the enemy. This situation 
bridges the radar capabilities gap between the combatant ships and the small missile craft 
of the DEFOR; however, this data-sharing capability is limited to combatant ships only; 
that is, small missile craft can only receive the information and not share what they detect. 
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Therefore, this situation is purposed to understand the how well the DEFOR can perform 
if such capabilities could be realized.  
G. DEFOR CAPABILITIES 
As mentioned before, the DEFOR is comprised of combatant ships and small 
missile craft; the combatant ships consist of destroyers (DDGs) and frigates (PFGs), while 
the small missile craft consist of large patrol craft (PCGs) and small fast-attack missile 
boats (FACGs). This section explains the DEFOR’s capabilities and characteristics.  
1. DEFOR Combatant Ships 
Various types of surface combatant ships are included in the DEFOR. These 
platforms reflect the following Taiwan Navy (ROCN) ships, including Keelung-class 
destroyers (Kidd class); Cheng-Kung class frigates (Perry-class); Kang-Ding-class frigates 
(Lafayette-class); and Ji-Yang-class frigates (Knox-class). These combatant ships’ features 
and characteristics are described in the remainder of this chapter.  
a. Maneuverability  
The maximum speed of both DEFOR destroyers and frigates is limited to 25 knots 
in the event of enemy contact and engagement. The standard cruise speed is programmed 
to 20 knots.  
b. Radar Detection and Classification Probability 
Radar characteristics reflect various types of radar; therefore, the radar performance 
for the entire contingent of the DEFOR combatant ships matches the OPFOR’s maximum 
range of 100 kilometers. Additionally, the DEFOR’s and OPFOR’s combatant ships share 
the same degradation rules — this is to say, the longer distance, the lower accuracy in 
detecting and classifying a target. Table 2 shows the DEFOR’s probability of the combatant 
ships’ radar range detection and classification, and these probabilities are independent with 




 Radar Range Detection and Classification Probability for 
the DEFOR Combatant Ships 
Range (km) 40 45 50 60 70 90 90 100 
Detection/Classification 
Probability  
0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
A DEFOR combatant ship’s radar has an 80% probability to detect a surface target and has an 
80% probability to be able to recognize and classify the target at a distance of 40 KM. 
 
c. Anti-Surface Cruise Missile Features and Attack Tactics  
The characteristics of anti-surface cruise missiles (ASCMs) for the DEFOR are 
described in the following lists.  
(1) Shooting Range: Owing to the limited area of operation (AOO), both the 
DEFOR’s and the OPFOR’s ASCMs are able to reach each force’s initial 
position; therefore, the maximum ASCM firing range for the DEFOR is 
determined to be 100 km as well. Additionally, missiles will not be launched 
unless a target is confirmed; thus, the shooting range is effectively from 40 
km to 100 km.  
(2) Capacity: Two types of platforms are defined for the DEFOR’s combatant 
ships: destroyers and frigates. DEFOR destroyers are determined to have 
four ASCMs, and DEFOR frigates are determined to have eight ASCMs to 
reflect their missile capacity.  
(3) Probability of Missile Hit: The probability of missile hit for the DEFOR 
combatant ships’ ASCM is defined as 0.7 across all ranges.  
(4) Number of Shots to Kill: A number of two shots to kill a DEFOR combatant 
ship is defined in the model.  
(5) Target Priority: The objective of the DEFOR is to stop the OPFOR’s large-
scale amphibious invasion. Therefore, the DEFOR’s target priority is the 
OPFOR’s HVTs; destroyers are considered secondary threats, and frigates 
are ranked as the last threat. Once the number of HVT casualties meets the 
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breakpoint, the PLA is assumed to stop the invasion due to unaffordable 
losses.  
2. DEFOR Small Missile Crafts 
Two types of platforms are considered into the DEFOR’s small missile craft to 
reflect ROCN including: PCGs and FACGs. The features and characteristics of these two 
platforms will be discussed shortly.  
a. Maneuverability  
The maximum speed of these vessels is limited to 30 knots in the event of a 
contingency situation, such as enemy contact or engagement. The standard patrol speed is 
defined as 25 knots.  
b. Radar Detection and Classification 
Owing to the nature of the DEFOR’s small missile craft, they have limited radar 
performance. The maximum detection range is limited to 25 kilometers. Radar degradation 
rules apply to small missile craft as well.  
 Radar Range Detection and Classification Rate for DEFOR 
Small Missile Craft 
Range (km) 7.5 10 12.5 15 20  25 
Detection  
And Classification Rate 
0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 
A DEFOR small missile craft’s radar has an 80% chance to detect a surface target 
and has an 80% probability to be able to recognize and classify the target at a 
distance of 7.5 KM 
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c. Anti-Surface Cruise Missile Feature and Attacking Tactics 
(1) Shooting Range: The small missile crafts’ shooting range remains the same 
as DEFOR combatant ships, which is effective from 40 km to 100 km.  
(2) Capacity: Both PCGs and FACGs platforms are defined to carry four anti-
surface cruise missiles (ASCMs) per platform.  
(3) Probability of Missile Hit: The probability of missile hit for the small 
missile craft is defined as 0.7.  
(4) Number of Shots to Kill: A number of two shots to kill a PCG or FACG 
platform is defined in the model.  
(5) Target Priority: Small missile craft share the same target priority with 
DEFOR combatant ships; thus, both PCGs and FACGs perceive OPFOR 
HVTs as the priority target, then combatant ships are considered a 
secondary threat to engage.  
d. Stealth Feature 
Owing to the nature of the DEFOR’s small missile craft, the platforms themselves 
are programmed to have a 60% concealment effect to reflect their organic stealth feature. 
H. SCENARIOS DEVELOPMENT  
All scenarios share the same story line, with the OPFOR maintaining the same 
attack logic and fixed force configuration; however, the DEFOR’s tactics and capabilities 
under specific communication situations are the only aspect to be varied. 12 scenarios have 
been developed to extend the original three DEFOR’s CONOPS in order to explore the 
operational effectiveness of the DEFOR based upon the use of defensive tactics and 
specific communication capabilities. Table 4 specifies the designated code name with 






 Table of Scenarios 
  Tactic1  Tactic2: 
CONOPS1 Situation 1 C1T1S1 (scenario 1)  C1T2S1 (scenario 4) 
Situation 2  C1T1S2 (scenario 7) C1T2S2 (scenario 10) 
CONOPS2 Situation 1  C2T1S1 (scenario 2) C2T2S1 (scenario 5) 
Situation 2  C2T1S2 (scenario 8) C2T2S2 (scenario 11) 
CONOPS3 Situation 1  C3T1S1 (scenario 3) C3T2S1 (scenario 6) 
Situation 2  C3T1S2 (scenario 9) C3T2S2 (scenario 12) 
Previous section specifies the following terms in scenario design; T1 is the DEFOR using 
preemptive tactic, T2 is the DEFOR using island-masking tactic, S1 is the DEFOR under a 
communication jammed situation, and S2 is the DEFOR with perfect communication. A code 
name is given to each scenario for the sake of easier reference, for instance, C1T1S1, scenario 1, 
represents the DEFOR using CONOPS 1 and preemptive tactics in defending against the OPFOR 
in a communication jammed situation.  
 
1. Scenarios 1–3 
Code names C1T1S1, C2T1S1, and C3T1S1 represent scenarios 1 to 3, 
respectively. In these scenarios, the DEFOR uses preemptive defense tactics under the 
communication jammed situations, and their platforms have to detect the enemy with their 
own organic sensors, and no information exchange (data-sharing) is allowed. Moreover, 
the DEFOR does not take advantage of the Peng-Hu archipelagos as concealment. 
Regarding the scenarios, C1T1S1 (scenario 1) specifies the DEFOR using CONOPS 1, 
C2T1S1 (scenario 2) specifies the DEFOR using CONOPS 2, and C3T1S1 (scenario 3) 
specifies the DEFOR using CONOPS 3.  
2. Scenarios 4–6   
Code names C1T2S1, C2T2S1, and C3T2S1 represent scenarios 4 to 6, 
respectively. In these scenarios, the DEFOR uses island-masking tactics by taking 
advantage of the Peng-Hu archipelago’s coastal terrains for concealment purpose under the 
communication jammed situation. Regarding the scenarios, C1T2S1 (scenarios 4), C2T2S1 
(scenario 5), and C3T2S1 (scenario 6) indicate the DEFOR’s use of CONOPS 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively.  
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3. Scenarios 7–9 
Code names C1T1S2, C2T1S2, and C3T1S2 represent scenarios 7 to 9, 
respectively. In these scenarios, the DEFOR uses preemptive defensive tactics with perfect 
communication. Therefore, the DEFOR combatant ships share information regarding 
enemy contact and enemy positions with small missile craft; these capabilities are expected 
to identify whether or not effective communications is an influential factor for the DEFOR 
in defending against a large-scale invasion. Regarding the scenarios, C1T1S2 (scenarios 
7), C2T1S2 (scenario 8), and C3T1S2 (scenario 9) indicate the DEFOR’s use of CONOPS 
1, 2, and 3, respectively.  
4. Scenarios 10–12 
Code names C1T2S2, C2T2S2, and C3T2S2 represent scenarios 10 to 12, 
respectively. In these scenarios, the DEFOR uses island-masking tactics with perfect 
communication. Regarding the scenarios, C1T2S2 (scenario 10), C2T2S2 (scenario 11), 
and C3T2S2 (scenario 12) indicate the DEFOR’s use of CONOPS 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
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IV. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT   
A. INTRODUCTION  
Once the MANA scenarios have been created, this thesis uses data farming 
techniques to efficiently experiment across numerous variables to assess the best force 
structures explored. To create the data, multiple models are run, with multiple repetitions 
in each model to explore wide range of inputs. This methodology allows analysts to explore 
many potential factors, any of which could have different impacts on the campaign result. 
Simulation and modeling have been used for military training and to support high level 
decision-making. A complex model that reflects all operational assumptions, factors, and 
available data is necessary, however, “the time-intensive data collection/scenario 
generation process, coupled with long run times, often limits analysts to a small set of 
simulation runs.” (Cioppa et al. 2004). Moreover, without a broader exploration on the 
possible factors, analysts might have limited insight, or worse, faulty results from their 
model. Thus, an exploratory analysis approached is introduced into this thesis, “enabled by 
simulations, design-of-experiments methods, and high- performance computing,” and it is 
“an attempt to help people think through complicated issues by illuminating the 
consequences of various assumptions, reinforcing or challenging intuition, illustrating 
alternatives that might not have been considered, and generating questions that otherwise 
might have been overlooked”. (Cioppa et al. 2004). The design of experiment used for the 
study presented in this thesis is explained later this chapter, preceded by specification of 
the variables of interest.  
B. VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
Two types of variables are introduced in the model: uncontrollable and controllable 
variables. Uncontrollable variables, also known as noise factors, are what the model 
designers cannot control in the real world (e.g., enemy tactics or weather). Controllable 
variables, also known as decision factors, can be determined (e.g., own force tactics) in the 
real world. We desire to assess the impact of those factors we can control. Thus, this thesis 
focuses on controllable variables in order to provide insight into the DEFOR’s operational 
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effectiveness in defending against a large-scale amphibious invasion. To answer the 
research questions, the DEFOR’s tactics, communication situations, and force numbers are 
considered to be variables. The OPFOR’s weapon and sensor range, tactics, force 
configuration are fixed, as well as the DEFOR’s weapon and sensor range described in 
Chapter III. Table 5 shows the decision factors’ values.  
 Decision Factors  
Factor  Value (Range) Explanation  
DEFOR Destroyers  4 to 6, by one The number of the 
DEFOR destroyers in 
a given run  
DEFOR Frigates 23 to 33, by one The number of the 
DEFOR frigates in a 
given run  
DEFOR Small missile craft 43 to 103, by one The number of the 
DEFOR small 
missile craft in a 
given run  
DEFOR Tactics  Preemptive/Island-masking The DEFOR’s 
defense tactics in a 
given run  
DEFOR Comms Situation Data-sharing/No Data-sharing The DEFOR’s given 
capability in a given 
run 
DEFOR CONOPS Small missile craft upfront/ 
Combatant ships upfront/ Mixed 
The DEFOR’s 
CONOPS in a given 
run  
Table 5 shows the decision factors varied in the scenarios. The determinations of the fixed 
settings are explained in Chapter III. 
 
C. EXPERIMENT  
There are two design phases in this thesis: the initial design and the full design. The 
initial design is to build 12 MANA scenarios to ensure reality is properly reflected. After 
the models and scenarios were assessed as adequate for analysis, variation of inputs was 
implemented into the simulation by using a nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube (NOLH) 
design to explore correlation and the impact on the pertinent variables.  
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1. NOLH 
The NOLH design technique was developed and improved by Lt. Col. Thomas 
Cioppa and Professor Thomas Lucas. It has been widely applied in NPS studies and by 
researchers around the world. It is often the case that scenarios are run incrementally based 
on one at a time factor variation or all possible combinations. The latter generates a large 
amount of design points and consumes huge computational power of hardware for high-
dimensional problems. A NOLH enables analysts to conduct simulation experiments 
efficiently with less design points than full factorial methods. This technique has good 
space-filling properties that sample throughout the experimental region. Since the design 
is nearly orthogonal, there is minimal confounding among the factors. The generated data 
points can be analyzed “by fitting models with main, quadratic, and interaction effects with 
nearly uncorrelated estimates of the regression coefficients for the linear effects terms.” 
(Cioppa, Lucas 2007). A NOLH generation tool created by Professor Susan Sanchez 
(Sanchez 2011) at NPS was used to construct the design of experiment in this thesis. The 
tables of the experimental design are provided in the appendix. Figure 7, the qualitative 
factor jittered scatter plot matrix, shows NOLH orthogonality and space filling properties 
on the decision factors in this thesis. 
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Jittered scatter plot matrix showing a good space-filling property with only 17 design points for 
each of the 12 scenarios.  
Figure 7. Jittered Scatter Plot Matrix of Variables in the Scenarios.  
2. Initial Design  
MANA was used to construct large PLAN amphibious invasion scenarios. The 
initial three scenarios were developed based on the essential three DEFOR’s CONOPs. 
Agents’ behaviors were continuously assessed during this development. Two factors, the 
DEFOR’s tactics and communication situation, were identified and implemented into the 
model to extend to a total of 12 base scenarios. One hundred runs for each scenario were 
conducted to generate 1,200 data points. These data points were reviewed by subject matter 
experts and military officers to verify the scenarios and provide face validity.  
3. Full Design  
After scenario verification and validation, the DEFOR’s force number was 
identified as a decision factor and introduced into the simulation to explore the DEFOR’s 
optimal force number in defending against the OPFOR. These decision variables include 
the number of the DEFOR’s destroyers, frigates, and small missile craft, as shown in Table 
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5. The decision variables’ value was varied through a NOLH design to generate 17 design 
points for each of the 12 scenarios, resulting in a total of 204 design points. Thirty runs 
were conducted for each design point to generate 6,120 data points. These data points were 
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V. ANALYSIS  
This chapter provides analysis and insight to the research question from the 
simulated campaigns. A comparison of the operational effectiveness of the DEFOR using 
different CONOPs, tactics, and under specific communication situations was conducted to 
determine the optimal defense strategy. As the CONOPs, tactics, and communication 
situations were adjusted, the DEFOR’s optimal force number was identified for each 
scenario to meet the PLAN breakpoint.  
A. DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING  
The MANA software output is in the form of a comma-separated values file that 
contains the number of the agents’ casualties, injuries, and the time steps, etc., of each run 
of the scenario. Each of the 12 scenarios were run through the NOLH to generate 204 
design points (i.e., unique input settings). 30 replications of each design point generate 
6,120 rows of data in the MANA output file as the raw data. Each row of the raw data 
represents one single replication of a design point. In order to conduct the analysis, JMP 
statistical analysis software is employed to process the MANA output file. To generate a 
summary file, JMP is used to calculate the mean value of the 30 replications of each design 
point. The summary files contain 204 rows of data, and each row of the data represents the 
average output of the 30 replications of a single design point.  
B. CRITERIA  
The OPFOR is assumed to retreat when it loses one third of its HVT vessels, which 
is 10 HVTs. This represents the assumed PLAN breakpoint. One of the MOEs in the 
analysis is the OPFOR’s average loss of HVTs across the base 12 scenarios. The MOE is 
the average loss of HTVs for OPFOR in the scenarios across all DEFOR force number 
variations. Another MOE is the 70% breakpoint in success rate. This MOE measures the 
percentage of the 30 scenario replications in which the DEFOR successfully kills 10 HVTs.  
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C. SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
In this section, we explore the operational effectiveness between the CONOPs, 
tactics, and communication situations. One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) testing is 
employed to compare the mean of the OPFOR’s HVT loss in the event of DEFOR using 
the various CONOPs. The mixed CONOPs outperforms the other two CONOPs across the 
scenarios: small missile craft forward and combatant ships forward, in killing the OPFOR’s 
HVTs. Figure 8 shows that the OPFOR’s average HVTs loss is 8.3 [7.7, 8.9] in the event 
of the DEFOR using the CONOPs of mix forces, 7.2 [6.6, 7.8] using the CONOPs of small 
missile craft forward, and 5.4 [4.8, 6] using the CONOPs of combatant ship forward. Note: 
the [] are used to give a 95% confidence interval on the mean. The mixed CONOPs has 
higher average HVTs loss across all scenarios, thus, the mix force CONOPs is recommend 
for the DEFOR.  
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Figure 8. CONOPs Comparison 
Using the one-way ANOVA test, preemptive tactics provide a larger advantage for 
the DEFOR than the island-masking defense tactics across all scenarios. Figure 9 shows 
the OPFOR’s average HVT loss is 7.8 [7.3, 8.3] when the DEFOR uses preemptive tactics 
and 6.1 [5.6, 6.7] using island-masking tactics.  
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Figure 9. Illustration Comparing Island Masking Tactics and 
Preemptive Tactics 
Lastly, the data-sharing situation benefits the DEFOR in defending against the 
OPFOR across all scenarios. Figure 10 shows that the OPFOR’s average HVT loss is 7.5 
[7, 8.1] when the DEFOR is under a data-sharing scenario, and 6.4 [5.9, 6.9] under the 
scenario without data sharing enabled. Thus, the optimal strategy for the DEFOR is to use 
the mixed force CONOPs with the preemptive tactics and data sharing capability.  
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Figure 10. Data Sharing Situation Comparison 
Previous results suggest the optimal defense strategy for the DEFOR is to use the 
mixed force CONOPs with the preemptive tactics under the data-sharing situations, which 
refers to scenario C3T1S2 (9). One-way ANOVA testing was conducted again to compare 
the breakpoint success rate across the base 12 scenarios. Figure 11 shows that on average, 
scenario C3T1S2 (9) outperforms the rest of the scenarios in achieving the 70% breakpoint 
success rate, as shown in Figure 11 and Table 6.  
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On average, scenario C3T1S2 (9) has the 80% breakpoint success rate across all DEFOR force 
variation.  
Figure 11. Scenario Comparison 
 Scenario Reference 
  Tactic1  Tactic2: 
CONOPS1 Situation 1 C1T1S1 (scenario 1)  C1T2S1 (scenario 4) 
Situation 2  C1T1S2 (scenario 7) C1T2S2 (scenario 10) 
CONOPS2 Situation 1  C2T1S1 (scenario 2) C2T2S1 (scenario 5) 
Situation 2  C2T1S2 (scenario 8) C2T2S2 (scenario 11) 
CONOPS3 Situation 1  C3T1S1 (scenario 3) C3T2S1 (scenario 6) 
Situation 2  C3T1S2 (scenario 9) C3T2S2 (scenario 12) 
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D. FORCE SIZE ANALYSIS  
In this section, decision factors are analyzed to explore their impact on the 
DEFOR’s breakpoint success rate by using different force combinations. Decision factors 
are the CONOPs, tactics, communication situations, and the number of forces available. A 
regression model is employed to uncover the relationship between the decision factors and 
the response variable. As before, the breakpoint is a 70% success rate for DEFOR. The 
regression model explains 80% of the variance of the breakpoint success rate (see the R 
squared value). The regression model also suggests that using the optimal strategy, DEFOR 
still needs 52 more small missile craft to achieve 70% breakpoint success rate. Recall that 
the DEFOR base force size is four destroyers, 23 frigates, and 43 small missile craft.  
Figure 12 shows that decision factors are statistic significant with 95% confidence interval. 
It is worth noting that the most important two factors are the number of frigates and small 
boats, respectively.  
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This regression model uses the expected DEFOR breakpoint success rate (70%) as the response 
variable with the decision factors.  
Figure 12. Regression Model for Expected Breakpoint Success Rate  
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To further explore the possible DEFOR’s force combination in meeting specific 
breakpoint success rate across the scenarios, a table of the DEFOR’s force size versus the 
breakpoint success rate is produced by using the regression model previously built.  
Table 7 shows the necessary minimum and maximum number of the frigates and small 
missile craft that DEFOR needs to achieve a 50% breakpoint success rate in each scenario. 
Table 8 indicates the DEFOR necessary force number to achieve a 70% breakpoint success 
rate in each scenario. 





# of Frigates # of missile craft # of Frigates # of missile craft 
C1 S1 23 121 23 120 
33 52                     (1) 33 51                        (4) 
S2 23 96 23 120 
33 27                     (7) 33 51                       (10)  
C2 S1 23 134 23 133 
33 65                      (2)  33 64                      (5) 
S2 23 109 23 133 
33 40                     (8)  33 64                       (11) 
C3 S1 23 99  23 98 
33 30                     (3)  33 29                      (6) 
S2 23 74 23 98 
33 5                        (9)  33 29                    (12) 
In scenario C1S1T1 (scenario 1), the DEFOR needs four destroyers, 23 frigates, and 121 small 
missile craft or four destroyers, 33 frigates, and 52 small missile craft to achieve 50% breakpoint 














# of Frigates # of missile craft # of Frigates # of missile craft 
C1 S1 23 142 23 141 
33 73                       (1) 33 72                       (4) 
S2 23 117 23 140 
33 48                     (7) 33 71                      (10) 
C2 S1 23 155 23 154 
33 86                    (2) 33 85                      (5) 
S2 23 130 23 153 
33 61                     (8) 33 84                     (11) 
C3 S1 23 120 23 119 
33 51                      (3) 33 50                      (6) 
S2 23 95 23 118 
33 26                      (9) 33 49                      (12)  
This table shows the necessary DEFOR’s force number to achieve 70% breakpoint success rate in 
specific scenario. The scenario number is marked to the right bottom cell of each category cell.  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY  
This thesis shows that an asymmetric force structure is necessary and valuable for 
the ROCN in defending against a country that has much larger naval force positioned in 
the Taiwan Strait. The DEFOR’s CONOPs, defense tactics, communication situation, and 
force number all contribute to the campaign result. Using campaign simulation and design 
of the experiment, this thesis provides insight regarding the ROCN optimal naval platform 
employment in defending a presumed OPFOR’s large-scale amphibious invasion.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the following question: 
The primary question: given Taiwan’s available military force, which of the three 
CONOPS listed below would be optimal to use to bring the PLAN amphibious assault 
force to its breakpoint?  
• Small missile craft upfront to conduct a surprise swarm attack while 
keeping combatant ships behind for major engagement with the PLAN 
amphibious assault force. 
• Combatant ships placed at the front line for major engagement, small 
missile craft placed behind to provide fire support and follow-on 
counterattack against the PLAN amphibious assault force. 
• A mixed-force configuration of combatant ships and small missile craft. 
The secondary question: if Taiwan’s current force is not sufficient to meet the 
PLAN’s breakpoint, what is Taiwan’s force size needed to achieve the goal? 
1. Primary Question 
The analysis reveals that the mixed force CONOPs with preemptive tactics under 
the data-sharing situation produce maximum benefit to the ROCN in defending against the 
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PLAN. By using this strategy, the ROCN is able to achieve 70% PLAN’s breakpoint on 
average. The purpose of the asymmetric warfare is to use expendable assets with numerical 
advantage to defeat overwhelming adversary with less effort. This specific strategy allows 
the DEFOR’s combatant ships and small missile craft to better defend against strong 
adversary in concert; thus, it brings more DEFOR missile shooters than other strategies to 
fight against the adversary to gain numerical superiority, which is “the force attribute that 
is consistently most advantageous” (Hughes 1995).  
2. Force Size  
There is a trade-off between frigates and small missile craft for the DEFOR to 
achieve the PLAN breakpoint. The analysis suggests that the optimal strategy for the 
DEFOR to achieve a 70% PLAN breakpoint rate requires either four destroyers, 23 frigates, 
and 95 small missile craft; or four destroyers, 33 frigates, and 26 small missile craft. The 
more frigates employed, the less small missile craft needed to achieve the mission goal, 
but the small missile craft has an economical advantage over the larger vessels, and also 
requires less manpower. A small missile craft only requires two to four personnel per vessel 
while the frigates require at least 120 personnel to meet the combat readiness.  
C. FURTHER INSIGHTS 
1. The Importance of Data-sharing 
Communication situation 2 allows DEFOR’s combatant ships to share enemy 
information with its’ small missile craft. This compensates for the small missile craft’s 
limited sensor capabilities and increases the DEFOR’s performance in defending against 
the adversary. As shown tables 7 and 8, under the no data-sharing situation, DEFOR has 
the same performance regardless of the tactics it uses; however, if the DEFOR is under the 
data-sharing situation, its operational effectiveness increases dramatically. This scenario is 
shown to save 25–30% more small missile craft while still achieving the PLAN breakpoint 
under the preemptive tactics. Additionally, the island-masking tactic does not improve the 
DEFOR’s performance regardless of the communication situation.  
49 
2. The Impact of Asymmetric Force 
The Taiwan Strait is a geographic location that lacks strategic depth. There is no 
room for retreat or replenishment during the battle; therefore, an intense force-on-force 
maritime campaign can be expected over the strait. Due to the high cost of operating and 
maintaining a traditional combatant ship, a maritime combat platform that is expendable is 
necessary. Small missile craft require less personnel and budget to operate, but given the 
proper tactics, they can provide the same lethality as combatant ships. Thus, their 
employment needs to be researched in order to defend against the enemy efficiently and 
effectively. More importantly, this work could minimize the amount of human life lost in 
a potential conflict.  
3. Combat Model Simulation  
Computer simulation enables users to simulate numerous operations and explore 
many possible outcomes without involving any physical naval platform or putting a single 
human at risk. In this thesis, 6,120 maritime campaigns were simulated across various 
scenarios and conditions with a broad range of the DEFOR force number input. This 
provides insight into the optimal defense strategy in defending against the possible 
adversary. The insight gained from this thesis cannot be studied by real life military 
exercises, and the importance of the model simulation should be addressed and applied to 
support decision-making in future operations.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The following recommendations are supported by the results from this thesis study.  
• In order to maximize small missile boats advantage, mix combatant ships 
and small missile craft together to fight in concert. The combatant ships 
can provide enemy information to the small missile craft while the small 
missile craft provide supporting fire.  
• To best utilize the asymmetric force advantage, data-sharing capability 
needs to be addressed. Without the information, the small missile craft are 
50 
not able to perceive the enemy nor provide any supporting fire; therefore, 
a well-sustained communication network is invaluable. 
• To defend against the enemy efficiently, a preemptive tactic allows the 
small missile craft to seek more opportunities to engage the enemy than 
island-masking tactic. 
• To achieve at least 70% winning probability under the optimal strategy, 
which is a  combination of the mixed force CONOPs, preemptive tactics, 
and data-sharing capability, the ROCN needs to employ at least four 
destroyers, 23 frigates, and 95 small missile boats or four destroyers, 33 
frigates, and 26 small missile craft. The needs and the advantages of the 
small-missile craft should be addressed in order to build an asymmetric 
force structure provide effective defense with economic constraints. 
E. FUTURE WORK  
The following possible future work was identified along the thesis development: 
• Analyze the impact of the adversary air threat on the DEFOR.  
• Perform a breakpoint analysis on various possible OPFOR force sizes.  
• Do a logistic analysis on the employment of the combatant ships and the 
small missile craft.  
• Analyze the impact of the DEFOR using the unmanned surface vehicle as 
a surveillance asset.  
• Many variables, such as sensor and weapon performance, speeds, etcetera 
were fixed in this analysis. A massive sensitivity analysis to find out how 
robust the conclusions are to these estimates would be valuable; perhaps 
using more flexible NOLHs from Hernandez et al. (2012) and MacCalman 
et al. (2017). 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix shows the nearly orthogonal Latin hypercubes (NOLH) design table 
used in the thesis. These 17 design points for these three factors was run in each of 12 
scenarios to generate 204 design points. With 30 runs of each design points, 6,120 
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